Mohammad Mehdi Maleki – Regional Affairs Expert
In a similar ceremony, several PKK forces in the Jasna Cave in Sulaymaniyah destroyed their weapons in the presence of a group of invited Turkish and Kurdish politicians.

According to Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), at this stage of the disarmament process and in line with the ongoing and numerous negotiations, Öcalan, the leader and founder of the PKK, has sincerely fulfilled his commitments and has timely understood the regional and international threats.

In an overall assessment of the process—which may take time to finalize and yield results—Turkish officials have made positive efforts in this regard so far. The reality is that the steps taken by both sides, though small and limited, have been impactful thus far.

Regarding the reasons behind the Turkish government’s decision to move toward peace and acknowledge the role of Kurds in the country, while there are multiple factors, one of Ankara’s arguments is the current government’s need for unity and rapprochement with the Kurds to sustain its desired policies in Turkey. Another factor is recent regional developments, particularly in Syria, and the future of the country’s northern and eastern regions, which are under the control of the SDF (close to the PKK).

In this context, it should be stated more clearly that the primary concern of Ankara’s officials was the growing closeness between Qamishlo and Tel Aviv. This development, if realized, could tip the scales of Israel’s influence in Syria in favor of the Zionist regime over Turkey.

Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what extent the historical process initiated by Turkey and the so-called PKK, which recently renamed itself the “Reconciliation and Democratic Society Group,” to achieve lasting peace and a democratic society, can take on more serious dimensions. Additionally, clear and well-reasoned answers must be provided to these fundamental and critical questions: Does PKK disarmament apply to its other branches? Does this peace and disarmament signify the end of armed activities and policies by other PKK branches, or could it lead to increased militarization by the YPG in Syria and the PJAK along the borders of Iran and Iraq?

Moreover, by examining the historical record and the PKK’s performance, some doubts about the future of this process are conceivable. In this regard, we must wait and observe how far this group can adhere to its commitments.

Another point worth mentioning is that subgroups affiliated with the PKK have committed numerous human rights violations against their own members, forces, and their families, which are in stark contrast to all international human rights conventions and peremptory norms of international law. Given the importance of this issue, it is best addressed within the framework of achieving the goals of the “Peace and Democratic Society” process and its broader dimensions. Those whose rights have been violated through force and violence—particularly children (individuals under 18) and women, as well as other members of these groups—must rightfully reclaim their rights. Those who have abused their organizational positions to violate these rights must be tried and held accountable in court for their actions.

Over the years, leaders of various PKK branches have recruited adolescents and young people under the pretext of securing Kurdish ethnic rights—through threats, deception, and even abduction—to compensate for their manpower shortages. They have exploited these individuals in the fight against the Turkish government and in wars unrelated to them, leading to the deaths of many. At the same time, the leaders themselves lived comfortably in European countries. This is an issue that should not be overlooked.

In recent years, families of victims of human rights violations by these groups, particularly the PJAK (the Iranian branch of the PKK), have filed complaints as private plaintiffs against the leaders of these groups. They hope that with the initiation of the PKK’s disarmament process and the provision of necessary conditions by the Turkish government, they too can reclaim their rights and, if their family members are still alive within these groups, reunite with them. Achieving this seemingly simple goal was impossible for the families of these groups’ members in past years, as those members were deprived of fundamental rights, such as contact with family and friends, and even owning a mobile phone. Under harsh conditions in military camps, these groups forced members into military training, hard labor, and erasing their past lives.

Similarly, it is necessary to incorporate the essential facilities and measures for the “safe return of PKK forces and their rehabilitation in their new lives” into this process so that this mechanism can also be effective in human rights reforms.

In conclusion, it is clear that given the PKK’s role and scope of activities at regional and international levels, the role of global powers—particularly the U.S., Russia, and France—cannot be ignored in the implementation of this process. It will also become clear in the future what role these actors have envisioned for the PKK. Will this group transition from a military tool to an intelligence or political tool for the U.S. or even Turkey? Time will shed light on many dimensions of this critical yet ambiguous process.