Dr. Kamran Karami – Visiting Researcher at the Center for Middle East Studies

The second meeting of the joint trilateral committee of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China to follow up on the Beijing Agreement was held in Riyadh on November 19,  2024. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Walid Abdul Karim Al-Kharaji, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and with the participation of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran headed by Mr. Majid Takht Ravanchi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Chinese delegation headed by Mr. Deng Li, Deputy Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.

The first round of this meeting was held in Beijing last year, and the next round is scheduled to be held in Tehran next year. This regular trilateral framework shows that the two sides have emphasized a roadmap for relations and are trying to pave the way for economic cooperation through political understanding and trust-building at the security level.

In a statement issued after the meeting, Tehran and Riyadh announced the continuous progress in Tehran-Riyadh relations and welcomed and supported a comprehensive political solution in Yemen in accordance with internationally recognized principles.

This statement’s emphasis on the Yemen issue reflects its importance in the outlook for Iran-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia’s lack of participation in the US military coalition against Ansar Allah in the months after October 7th indicates its desire for a political solution and to avoid a re-ignition of the Yemen issue on its southern borders.

Beyond this image, the Saudi Crown Prince’s emphasis on learning from historical experiences and the Iranian First Vice President’s emphasis on not going backward in relations indicate a change in priorities at the domestic and regional levels of the two actors, which has made managing tensions in the context of Trump’s return to power a necessity.

For Riyadh, such a heavy investment in diplomatic initiatives, most notably with Iran, reflects a focus on economic growth rather than political confrontation and an emphasis on de-risking that regional dynamics may jeopardize the country’s grand Vision 2030 projects, which require a stable political environment. High-level regional diplomatic engagement after the Gaza war showed that Iran-Saudi reconciliation has successfully emerged from its first significant test since the normalization of relations.

Another shift that is important to Saudi Arabia is avoiding being infected by the volatile bipartisan US foreign policy in the Middle East, which led the kingdom to assess its security components and reconsider its security dependencies after the 2019 Aramco facility bombings. Security self-reliance, diversification of partners, and resolving issues with rivals are three levels embedded in Saudi Arabia’s security vision.

The reality is that Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf Arab states are reluctant to return to the tense 2017-2019 era, as this approach did not serve their interests. One could even expect that Saudi Arabia’s changing priorities will lead this actor to exploit its personal relationship with Trump to manage the conflict and create a relatively stable political environment.