Moslem Taghizadeh – Artificial Intelligence and Digital Transformation Expert

The competition between China and the United States in the field of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity should not be viewed merely as a technological race or even a classic geopolitical conflict. What is unfolding is a clash between two different conceptions of “power in the digital age”; two philosophies of governance, each striving to shape the future of the world’s information order according to its own internal logic. In this context, artificial intelligence is neither a tool nor a goal; rather, it is the primary arena for redefining authority, sovereignty, and control in the twenty-first century.

From the American perspective, artificial intelligence is a natural extension of techno-capitalism and market-driven innovation. Power emerges from corporations, platforms, and data ecosystems, with the government playing a largely delayed and reactive regulatory role. However, this very structure, considered America’s strength, has become a contradiction in cybersecurity: when data, algorithms, and information infrastructure are in the hands of private actors, the line between national security and corporate interests blurs. The TikTok case becomes significant from this viewpoint.

America’s official concern about TikTok is the Chinese government’s access to user data or the potential for intelligence infiltration operations, but the issue is deeper than these claims. Changing TikTok’s ownership structure, even if part of its shares are transferred to American consortia, does not change the nature of the algorithm, the logic of its recommender system, or its power to shape public attention. An algorithm is not merely code, but the embodiment of a cognitive logic: what gets seen, what gets amplified, and what gets marginalized. From this perspective, TikTok is not merely an external threat; it is a mirror in which America sees its own vulnerability in governing platforms.

The strategic point here is that the United States, in its effort to counter the alleged Chinese threat, is moving towards a kind of “securitization of ownership”; i.e., the assumption that shifting shares and legal control solves the security problem. But this approach can itself lead to a kind of structural abuse: an unprecedented concentration of regulatory power over data in the hands of the government or actors aligned with it, without transparent accountability mechanisms. In other words, the danger is not only “Chinese infiltration,” but the transformation of social platforms into legitimate tools of national security on both sides of the competition.

This issue draws attention to the history of cyber competition and digital armaments. Unlike conventional weapons, cyber tools are inherently ambiguous, deniable, and constantly evolving. There are no clear red lines or stable agreements that can effectively constrain state behavior. Artificial intelligence has intensified this situation. Today, a cyberattack no longer requires sustained human presence; algorithms can autonomously detect, adapt, infiltrate, and even make decisions. This means that speed, scale, and uncertainty have reached levels that undermine the logic of classical deterrence.

In this space, America and China are building offensive and defensive capabilities, but with different mindsets. America seeks more technological superiority and operational flexibility, while China pursues systemic resilience and centralized control. This difference is not merely technical; it is philosophical.

From the Chinese perspective, cybersecurity is part of social security. Data is considered a national resource, and artificial intelligence is a tool for maintaining cohesion, predicting instability, and macro-managing society. Therefore, AI governance in China is inherently state-driven, preemptive, and integrated.

In contrast, America is still grappling with this fundamental question: can unbridled innovation, platform freedom, and national security be maintained simultaneously? Many recent American policies suggest that the implicit answer to this question is negative, but this admission, rather than leading to a review of digital governance philosophy, often manifests as ad hoc measures, export restrictions, or ownership pressures. This is why some analysts believe America is “running on the wrong track” in the AI race: focusing on model size and speed of progress without solving the problems of trust, governance, and the sustainable integration of AI into the social fabric.

On the other hand, China, despite its rapid progress, faces a different challenge. Strict control over data and algorithms, while creating security and managerial advantages, carries the risk of reduced creativity, cognitive diversity, and global legitimacy. The international acceptance of Chinese AI technologies depends not only on their technical quality but also on the level of trust in their intent and governance framework. Ultimately, the China-U.S. competition is a competition over who defines the rules of the game.

At a deeper level, this competition signifies a transition from an order based on hard power to an order based on cognitive control. Security is no longer just about protecting infrastructure; it is about managing human perception, attention, and decision-making. In this sense, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity are intertwined because both deal directly with the cognitive layer of society. TikTok, malware, recommendation algorithms, language models, and surveillance systems are all components of a single field.

If this competition continues without common frameworks, transparency, and normative constraints, the primary danger will not be the victory of one over the other, but the erosion of global trust in technology. A world where every platform is suspect, every algorithm is a potential weapon, and every piece of data can be considered a threat.

The other fundamental issue is not which country has stronger artificial intelligence; rather, it is which one can provide a model of digital governance that is both efficient, legitimate, and applicable to today’s pluralistic world. The China-U.S. competition is a test for the future of political rationality in the age of artificial intelligence, a test whose outcome will be decisive far beyond the borders of these two countries.

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