Mohammad Khajouei – Researcher on Lebanese Affairs
It must be noted that to this day, the Israeli regime has taken actions on the ground, and the Americans are trying to advance these security and military actions in the political arena. Accordingly, they pressured the Lebanese government to approve the plan for disarming Hezbollah. This is because Hezbollah’s weapons have always been a significant threat against the Israeli regime and have managed to create a sort of balance against this regime over the past two decades. However, today, the Israeli regime, with America’s help, wants to change this equation. However, the implementation of this plan faces numerous uncertainties, raising the question of which direction Lebanon’s future will take in the shadow of approving such a plan. Four scenarios are probable for the future of Lebanon’s political developments: The first scenario is that the plan proceeds based on what was approved in the Lebanese government, meaning the Lebanese army presents a plan for disarmament and implements it. The implication of this scenario is that Lebanon effectively enters a kind of civil war. On one side is Hezbollah, which opposes disarmament and believes that, under conditions where the Israeli regime occupies part of Lebanon, this plan is a blow to Lebanon’s security. On the other side is the army as Lebanon’s official force. If these two sides were to confront each other, it would mean Lebanon entering a civil war. The realization of such a scenario, though unlikely, is very dangerous. Because there is concern within Lebanon’s internal sphere, even within its security and military institutions, that Lebanon might return to its past and repeat the bitter experience of the 15-year civil wars in the country. Recent news has also indicated that the Lebanese army command is very cautious about implementing this plan unilaterally and engaging in direct confrontation with Hezbollah. For this reason, it appears that there is a significant obstacle to the realization of this plan. Another issue is that since the Israeli regime has effectively shown no prospect of withdrawing from the five occupied points in southern Lebanon and ending its attacks against this country, and has not even accepted that this plan proceed within a step-by-step framework, the Lebanese government and army therefore lack the necessary capability and legitimacy to advance the implementation of the Hezbollah disarmament plan within the domestic sphere. Meaning, domestically, moving towards disarmament could only become possible if, in return, the Israeli regime also commits to withdrawing from Lebanon and ceasing its attacks—a prospect which does not exist. Specifically, the American side also recently stated that disarmament must happen first, and Lebanon must take steps in this regard. Therefore, with these considerations, this scenario must be considered almost improbable. The second scenario is that the current fragile situation continues, meaning the plan effectively remains on paper, Hezbollah maintains its position, and the Israeli regime continues its attacks against Lebanon.
In this scenario, the status quo continues, and the disarmament plan is not implemented in practice for now and will be left for a later time.
The third scenario is that internal parties in Lebanon sit at the negotiation table and repeat experiences like the Taif Conference after the civil wars or the Doha Conference in 2008, and enter into negotiations and dialogue over the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. This approach is also in line with Lebanon’s political tradition, where disputed issues are resolved through a process of dialogue based on the Lebanese National Pact and the country’s established traditions. Although this scenario is desirable, its realization is very unlikely. This is because unprecedented pressures from the US and the Israeli regime have destroyed the existing balance in Lebanon’s political and sectarian atmosphere, and it is practically very unlikely that they would want to allow Lebanese groups to enter into dialogue and reach a middle-ground solution. In other words, since the project of the Israeli regime and America is a unilateral project based on disarming Hezbollah, they oppose any agreement on this matter. The fourth scenario, which is much more probable than the others, is that, likely due to the deadlock forming in the domestic Lebanese sphere for implementing the disarmament plan, the Israeli regime will this time try to increase its attacks against Hezbollah to deal once again blows to this movement on the operational ground. That is to say, this plan will not be implemented in the political arena, but on the operational ground, the Israeli regime, justifying it by the approval of this plan in the Lebanese government, may carry out attacks against Hezbollah, in which case a reaction from Hezbollah to these actions is also probable. It seems that in the current conditions, the fourth scenario—escalation of attacks by the Israeli regime in the medium term—and the second scenario—continuation of the current fragile situation—are the most probable scenarios. At the same time, the outbreak of civil war or national dialogue is a scenario with a lower probability of occurrence.