This measure has raised concerns of the United States and its allies in the region; because the tested missile can hit the United States itself with a loaded nuclear warhead. In addition, Pyongyang announced that the test was actually a simulation of an attack on the soil of the US and South Korea.

In response to such measures, South Korea and the United States organized an air exercise and once again displayed their deterrence strategy in the zone of detection of air defense of Korea. Officials of the US Department of Defense announced that despite the fact that the country does not consider the recent missile test to be an immediate threat to itself and its allies, it will take immediate action to assess the situation.

In addition, the White House considered the exercise between Seoul and Washington as an indicator of the decisive power of the two-nation alliance in the region, as well as the unwavering commitment of the United States to create an extensive deterrence in defense of South Korea and other regional allies.

What can be concluded from the developments is the unprecedented increase in the level of tensions in the Korean Peninsula. On the one hand, Pyongyang has tested nearly 40 missiles in recent years, which is unprecedented since the end of the Korean War. On the other hand, criticisms are heard in the United States regarding the ineffectiveness of the country’s strategies towards the Korean Peninsula, as well as to South Korea, over the excessive dependence on the US deterrence. Therefore, investigating the causes of Pyongyang’s missile tests, the ineffectiveness of the United States strategies, South Korea’s strategic inaction, and the role of other regional powers such as China in the current crisis will be points that will help to clarify the angles of the subject which is being analyzed.

Ineffective US strategies at crisis point

In the United States, there is a hot debate over the effectiveness and inefficiency of the country’s strategies in dealing with the Korean Peninsula crisis, and the facts on the ground have significantly put the critics of the White House policies in a superior position. Decades of pressure, sanctions and reliance on maximum deterrence not only have not made the situation better but made it worse, as Kim Jong-un; the leader of North Korea has declared that they will not go back even if Washington maintains the sanctions for ten thousand years. Successive governments in the United States, believing in the need for complete disarmament of Pyongyang, have tied any negotiations with that country to this goal, unaware that North Korea’s nuclear program, along with the development of missile technologies, has reached a stage of purely nuclear deterrence. Just like what happened with the Soviet Union, the United States can establish stability in the Korean peninsula only by using similar nuclear power, and such action will require creation of an active security umbrella in the region.

Regarding the diversity of opinions and ideas in the United States, some critics of the country’s policies against North Korea believe that recognition of a nuclear Pyongyang will provide a better perspective for adopting future security strategies, although it seems that in such comments, two critical issues of dragging the East Asian region in the nuclear competition as well as the risk of the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime has not been included; issues that can challenge the desired international order of that country in addition to the US allies in Southeast Asia if they reach a critical point.

Some others believe that the issue of complete disarmament should be removed as a precondition for the negotiations and that the two countries should negotiate in the same position of nuclear deterrence, as was the case with the United States and the Soviet Union in the 60s. Finally, some others believe that the harsh and tough deterrence policy that is currently underway should be intensified and North Korea should be prevented from any hostile action against the United States and its allies. In general, it can be concluded that such opinions are more due to necessity, being placed in the complexity of decision-making in foreign policy, as well as Washington’s international strategies to establish stability in areas where the country has interests.

North Korea in balance of fear, courage

Probably from the very beginning of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, the authorities of that country had come to the conclusion that no one would be willing to tolerate a nuclear North Korea with long-range and powerful ballistic missiles. It seems that they decided to achieve their desired deterrence in this way and finally force the United States to support their position and the nuclear capability of that country. Although this happened in the case of India and some other countries, it has never happened in North Korea. Washington knows very well that affirmation of a nuclear Pyongyang would be equivalent to a nuclear effort by countries that are willing to endure several years of sanctions and pressure but achieve nuclear deterrence.

North Korea also seeks maximum deterrence due to fear. Kim Jong-un has shown that whether he wants it or not, the more he fears, the more crisis he will create. The leader of North Korea, who was afraid of removing the dragon’s head due to South Korea’s new strategy of preventive and tough measures, increased the development of his missile programs. In addition, the country’s nuclear program changed from a response to a hostile attack to a preemptive nuclear strike and finally delegated the order to use atomic weapons to other people as well; an issue that can increase the possibility of mistakes in calculations and the risk of a nuclear crisis. Thus, Pyongyang has shown that it can be a tough challenge to the inconsistent hegemon of the established order.

A complicated future

A combination of the United States caught up in the complex chess of the region, an anxious South Korea with a sense of security backwardness, a North Korea interested in net deterrence, as well as a stake-seeking China will shape a large part of the future of the Korean Peninsula.

As mentioned before, the United States cannot easily recognize a nuclear North Korea. Such an action will pose a problem to the basis of the international order. In this way, Washington will have two options. First, it will have no choice but to negotiate and recognize at least a part of Pyongyang’s nuclear program, taking Beijing’s considerations into account. The second option is to create deterrence in the region, heating the oven of a security competition in the region and in fact playing more with fire, which of course will also involve China. First, the United States must make it clear to North Korea that an attack on Seoul would be an attack on New York. This is the way that South Korea will not at least develop the mentality of withdrawing from the NPT or producing nuclear weapons in its mind and will rely on the security umbrella of the United States. On the other hand, for China, which usually does not welcome security competitions and after the Korean War, it has always followed the war deterrence program in the Korean Peninsula, such measures of the United States will contain a concrete message regarding Taiwan; the strategy of valuing North Korea will make the strategy of One China even more impossible.