Sadeq al-Mahdi, the leader of the most important opposition party in Sudan, who was also the last democratically elected prime minister, after noticing that despite the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir and the formation of a military council and the beginning of power transition to civilians, the people continued their sit-in protests in front of the army headquarters in Khartoum, sounded the alarm that the protesters should be vigilant that the military would not lose patience and be forced to turn to violence under the growing pressure of protesters to leave the field.

At first glance, it may be said that the 83 year old Sudanese political leader, who was toppled by Omar al-Bashir in a 1989 coup d’état , was repeatedly expelled and imprisoned. In his last return to the country in December, Al-Mahdi joined the wave of popular protests against tripling the price of bread. By making such statements he tries to safeguard the people’s interests and steer the situation in a favorable manner. But when we learn that the veteran politician, before the outbreak of the recent developments, had established intimate ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and somehow vowed allegiance to them, then perhaps the clandestine attempts by these regional godfathers could become more evident in the direction of the situation in Sudan.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are sensitive to any changes or political and social instability in the Afro-Arab countries, and they are always seeking to maintain the status quo. But this time about Sudan, they certainly have not sufficed to a mere opposition to changes by learning a lesson from the 2011 uprisings. Instead, they are trying to orchestrate the power transition in a way  that their own interests are preserved and safeguarded.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with or without Sadeq al-Mahdi, can under no circumstances be able to ignore the consequences of the popular uprising for their interests in the region. When they once failed to manage the events in Egypt, they witnessed the getting into power of Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood; nevertheless, they succeeded in bringing a military commander, Abdel Fattah Sisi into power with the support of the United States and Mossad; they are afraid of everything that may change the regional stability and, in particular, leads them to a counterweight against them. Accordingly, their desirable plan in Sudan is also the rule of the military with the scale of democracy. In this way, they can maintain their own control over Khartoum by financial means.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia, in particular, see credible strategic reasons to prevent the formation of a democratic government in Sudan. In addition, they provide the necessary background to advance their strategy, and with the experience they have of Egypt and Yemen, this time they plan and act in order to influence Sudan’s transformation by forecasting the situation. Riyadh had previously established close ties with Sudan’s Bashir by hosting some 25,000 Sudanese troops in the wake of its genocide in Yemen. In fact, General Burhan, the current head of the military council, led the Sudanese troops to join the Saudi alliance.

On this basis, it is clear that Riyadh’s support for military rule in Sudan will in the first place guarantee the continued presence of Sudanese troops in the Yemeni war, while the council announced that Sudan’s military missions will continue alongside Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

The rise of any democratic civilian government in Khartoum could undermine this trend. The images of the devastation and genocide of the defenseless Yemenis annoy the people of Sudan, like any other free man and woman in the world, and these days, when the army retreats before the civilian population step by step against the will of the people in the immediate transfer of power to the civilians, the rulers of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are more worried about the loss of control of the situation in Sudan.

Naturally it would be better for them if the military gain power in Sudan in the garb of democracy. Meanwhile, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have promised $3 billion in donation to Sudan under the guidance of the military council. Also, each of them has already provided $250 million in advance to the vacant reserve of the Central Bank so that at least at the beginning of the new developments in this key country bordering the Red Sea, the initiative will not be lost.

A substantial portion of this aid – over two billion dollars – is to be spent on financing food, medicine and energy needs. In return the people and the protesters in Khartoum have cleverly rejected the aid offer in their slogans; they also have the Egyptian experience in front of them; and of course, the young and foreign educated Sudanese expatriates have returned and joined the ongoing revolution as the driving force behind the Sudanese revolution through social networks review the lessons of their Egyptian friends on how they should interact and counteract the military.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in any case, are trying to control the developments in Sudan. Accordingly, if strong level of the military’s presence in power could not be attained, whether during the transitional period or afterwards, they would naturally endeavor to approach the transitional sovereignty with a civilian majority, a situation which, given the rapid development in Sudan look like unavoidable.  After the big rallies last Thursday, the military has no choice but to give in to the demands of civil society organizations, and at the head of them the Sudan Trade Union, which has proposed drawing up a provisional constitution.

The situation may even be escalated in the coming days, with the addition of sit-in camps by the suffering people of Sudanese cities in front of the army and intelligence headquarters in Khartoum. They have come from cities like Darfur and Kordofan regions which have always been suppressed by the army. Accordingly, the transfer of power to a majority of the civilian population in Sudan is completely predictable if the violent reaction of the army and al-Bashir loyalists does not occur – as Sadeq al-Mahdi has warned about it somehow.

At that time, when people become in charge of the administration of the country from the street floors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are certainly able to play a role, because in any case, there is a need for financial resources to run the country. The two rich regional states by announcing that they want to be “alongside the people,” will have to go for the second priority, namely preventing anarchy in Sudan, which could spread beyond the borders, especially to Saudi Arabia.

An obedient rule for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is, first and foremost, the rule of the military in Sudan. If this is not the case an apparently democratic government and an authoritarian president, such as in Egypt, will be preferred. The two countries are definitely not interested to see popular governments assume power in Sudan or any other country in the region. The public opinion in these countries, especially the youth, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, is more demanding than ever, and the adventures of Mohamed bin Salman on the regional scene, as we see in Yemen, and the kind of feudal style engagement with Donald Trump, has already made the young and educated generation in Saudi Arabia sensitive.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates need Sudanese assistance on other issues like the Egyptian interests in the Nile water right. Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia are the three main pillars of the Nile water right case, which is somehow a kind of guarantor of food security in Egypt and the countries of the region. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have so far, with indiscriminate oil supplies, tried to pay the blood money of the Sudanese military in the Yemeni war; From now on too, they will try to preserve their sphere of influence in North Africa by bringing a military strong government into power.