The Pakistani Taliban (TTP): Root of Tensions or Axis of Reconciliation?
In an interview with the website of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, Nozar Shafiei emphasized that the primary cause of strained relations between Pakistan and the Taliban lies in the activities of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). He noted that the TTP, which Islamabad considers a terrorist group, has become a significant obstacle in bilateral relations by operating from bases in Afghan territory. Pakistan has repeatedly urged the Taliban to curb the TTP’s presence on its soil, but the Taliban, viewing the group as Pakistan’s internal issue, have refused to take direct responsibility.

Shafiei pointed out that the historical ties between the TTP and the Taliban, once hosts to the Taliban during the collapse of Afghanistan’s former government, have now reversed, with the TTP expecting reciprocal support from the Taliban to achieve its goals in Pakistan. This dynamic not only strained relations but also triggered the mass expulsion of Afghan refugees as a reaction to this dispute.

According to the analyst, the resumption of relations is likely the result of a fragile compromise over managing the TTP. However, the Taliban’s ideological stance and deep historical ties with the TTP could jeopardize this agreement, especially if the Taliban continues tacit support for the TTP or fails to control its activities. Thus, he warns that without concrete measures to neutralize the TTP threat, this reconciliation could quickly unravel, reigniting tensions.

Economic Motivations: Convergence Under Trade Corridors?
Shafiei further highlighted Pakistan’s economic priorities as a key driver behind this diplomatic shift. He argued that Pakistan’s national security framework prioritizes economic development and regional connectivity, compelling Islamabad to resolve disputes with Afghanistan to realize its ambitions of linking with Central Asia, Iran, and the Persian Gulf through air, rail, and maritime networks. The Taliban, viewing economic stability as a strategic asset, also needs these connections to sustain growth and attract foreign investment.

The analyst cited the recent agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan as a sign of economic convergence between the two sides. He stressed that previous tensions had disrupted trade corridors like the Karachi-Kandahar-Jalalabad route, and this mutual loss pushed both sides to mend ties.

Shafiei also noted that competition between Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and Iran’s Chabahar Port has given Islamabad an additional incentive to strengthen relations with Kabul to solidify its position in regional economic equations.

The trilateral meeting in Beijing, emphasizing economic cooperation and linking Afghanistan to the Belt and Road Initiative, laid the groundwork for this convergence. However, Shafiei believes the success of these efforts depends on overcoming logistical and political obstacles, including international sanctions on the Taliban.

Regional Geopolitics: India’s Rivalry and the Taliban’s Alignment?
The senior South Asia analyst cautiously assessed the geopolitical dynamics, describing the resumption of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations as “fragile.” Shafiei pointed to the Taliban’s growing closeness to India, Pakistan’s long-time rival, suggesting this trend has forced Islamabad to reconsider its policies.

He stated: “Pakistan, once the Taliban’s primary backer, now fears Kabul may become a strategic partner for New Delhi, especially after the Taliban’s economic outreach to India.”

Shafiei sees competition between Gwadar and neighboring ports exacerbates these concerns, as strengthening rival ports could weaken Pakistan’s economic influence. He noted that while the diplomatic thaw began before recent India-Pakistan tensions, Islamabad’s fear of the Taliban aligning with India accelerated reconciliation efforts with Kabul.

He added: “Though this geopolitical dynamic facilitated the current compromise, regional rivalries and external actors’ influence leave bilateral relations vulnerable to instability.” Thus, he warned that the Taliban’s tilt toward India, without considering Pakistan’s sensitivities, could trigger Islamabad’s backlash, undermining current diplomatic efforts.

Outlook: Stability or Fragility?
The senior analyst outlined three parallel trends shaping South Asia: “Geopolitical conflicts, economic-centric shifts, and internal security challenges.” According to Shafiei, India-Pakistan tensions, past conflicts with the Taliban, and internal crises like TTP activities in Pakistan and resistance movements in Afghanistan have left the region in a complex state.

He argued: “Regional states are leaning toward economic pragmatism and de-escalation, but which trend prevails depends on circumstances and actors’ capabilities.”

Shafiei stressed that the current détente could stabilize relations if Pakistan and the Taliban jointly manage security challenges, especially the TTP threat. However, he cautioned that the Taliban’s ideological stance, historical ties to the TTP, and geopolitical rivalry with India keep relations fragile. Without astute management, the region risks recurring tensions.

He concluded that trilateral cooperation with China, leveraging CPEC’s potential, and establishing regional confidence-building mechanisms—including Iran’s role in enhancing regional security and economy—could strengthen ties. Yet, success hinges on political will and coordination among regional actors.