Maryam V. Kazemi, Ph.D. in Political Geography

The Biden and Trump administrations see the QUAD as the key to a greater focus on the Indo-Pacific region, particularly as a counterweight to China’s actions. The QUAD members, therefore, see themselves as a viable alternative to China, offering supply chain diversification and alternative infrastructure support, competing with the China-centric system in Asia, and reducing the risk of over-reliance on China by the region’s countries.

Meanwhile, experts believe that the QUAD is gradually becoming a “hub of new activity” as the US asks Asian countries to source their energy and minerals from countries other than China. However, according to experts, primarily Chinese, it is unlikely that these four countries, despite being the world’s first, third, fifth, and 13th largest economies, will be able to replace China economically in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, it is unclear whether the four QUAD powers can maximize their opportunities for cooperation while ensuring that broader geopolitical rivalries do not overwhelm the group again. In this context, the US has not made a specific commitment to give the QUAD members greater access to the US market, and the group lacks enforcement mechanisms.

However, in the US political climate, proposing and even ratifying international trade agreements is challenging. This reality has weakened QUAD’s position in the region, as many countries worry that its members lack the will and resources to make an impact in addressing many of the current crises. In fact, any common vision for the region must include a sustained and purposeful effort to address issues ranging from ensuring security to promoting economic development, which are of great importance to the members.

On the other hand, it seems that this quadrilateral alliance will not be effective due to the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific concept for the QUAD members and Indonesia’s absence from it. Meanwhile, China’s economic and trade relations with each of the QUAD members are a significant challenge.

Another significant challenge the Quadrilateral Alliance faces is the deepening of China’s relations with Iran, which could affect the direction of the policies considered by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue through components such as the development of corridors, transport and transit, diplomacy, and energy security.

However, Iran has a special role in implementing and developing China’s “Belt and Road” geo-economic project due to its geographical location and geopolitical foundations. Among them, the unique capabilities of the corridor and land-air-sea transit routes are in question.

The pursuit of the Belt and Road initiative is leading to geopolitical competition between China and India in the forks of the Indo-Pacific region, including the Persian Gulf and the Sea of ​​Oman. It should be noted that India is always looking for opportunities to confront China in its peripheral space and is very willing to unite with foreign powers to pursue common goals.

The United States considers India an important and strategic partner, effective for leading South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active and connected to Southeast Asia, and a dynamic power in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) that can challenge China. Therefore, according to Chinese officials, India has taken on the role the United States wants to play in the region.

There is no doubt that India considers the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor a challenge to its geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic interests that could create gaps in its communications with Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. Hence, India is interested in pursuing or coordinating its trade policies with Iran.

From India’s perspective, Iran can be influential in implementing plans to forge bilateral political and economic relations through geoeconomics components and transit corridors in the coherence and sustainability of such cooperation.

On the other hand, studies and research show that the China-Pakistan transit corridor is very costly, time-consuming, and somewhat unsafe. So, together with land transportation costs, the time spent in Pakistani seaports and customs clearance at ports and border crossings has the longest time among the corridors of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Program. Noting these considerations, Iran is regarded as the best corridor for expanding international trade due to the safe and secure route to Pakistan (Karachi Port and Gwadar Port).

In the context of the great geostrategic game between China and the members of the Quad alliance, especially India, Iran’s growing importance has been increasingly noticed. Each country is trying to advance its interests in a rapidly changing strategic landscape. Undoubtedly, there are potential strategic gains for Iran, focusing on trade-economic power, which can be gained from bilateral relations between the two sides. Of course, this is possible as long as the stability of Iran’s security environment is maintained.

However, Iran is deeply suspicious of the interests and intentions of the Quad members in the region. Therefore, geopolitical competition between China and the Quad members will likely present Iran with a challenging economic environment and significant threats. These behaviors will lead to tough decisions for Iran to align its priorities with the interests of the Quad members or to engage in deep security cooperation with China and other regional rivals. However, Iran’s bold stance towards such an approach will be based on a sustained and long-term commitment to creating the necessary conditions for securing its national interests and security stability.