The characteristics of traditional German foreign policy used to be defined in the form of solidarity with the West (Westbindung), integration into the European Union, multilateralism, the pursuit of a law-based international order, membership in NATO, reluctance to take leadership of coalitions, Eastern policy and change through trade (Ostpolitik and Wandel durch Handel). This foreign policy was not based on military means, and some pundits described this foreign policy as “peaceful” and referred to it as the “civil power” of Germany.

This year, just like when Helmut Kohl, the former chancellor of Germany, announced his so-called 10-point program in 1989, Schultz surprised almost everyone, because different individuals and groups in Germany were unaware of it and until the unveiling of these plans, public discussions had not yet taken place. Therefore, the opposition groups have not found an opportunity to prevent or hinder the new policies.

But like Kohl, Schultz tried to make the most of the prevailing situation at this point in time, because he announced new policies just at the time when Russia’s war against Ukraine had provided a favorable public atmosphere for the acceptance of these historical policies. In his speech, he spoke about a series of sanctions against Russia and a commitment to new European weapons projects, from armed drones to equipping the German armed forces with new jets capable of carrying and launching American nuclear warheads in the form of NATO nuclear partnership.

In the past, such issues were considered “unsolvable” in Germany and have continued for years and even decades. Now, however, the German chancellor, by bypassing the bewildering processes of domestic politics, which tends to be in favor of former extremists completely under the influence of the atmosphere of the war between Russia and Ukraine, has placed on the agenda the return to the era of relying on hard power.

Interestingly, the sanctions imposed by Germany and the EU against Russia since late February have the potential to cause major disruption and damage to German businesses. Germany’s export-based economic model is highly suspicious of changes in the international environment, and German governments have traditionally been skeptical of sanctions, especially against important global players. Therefore, these changes in German foreign policy should be considered important, because they have clearly subordinated commercial interests to foreign and security policy considerations.

Germany before 1949 often followed its own way (Sonderweg) in foreign relations. Of course, this concept showed its ineffectiveness during the two world wars with the failures of this country. Furthermore, because the Nazis had discredited the German military, West German foreign policy from 1945 onwards focused on legalism rather than militarism. It was for this reason that the promotion of international law and the creation of law-based international relations were among the priorities of Germany’s foreign policy.

It can be concluded that Germany was a strong supporter of multilateralism and international organizations for several decades due to the humiliation and historical defeats it suffered. Of course, even now, with the “turning point” policy, it seems that Germany is still seeking multilateralism and “not being alone” in the form of NATO and the European Union, but it has defined this multilateralism only on the western front and has adopted a dangerous approach that can undermine the international system based on law. Accordingly, the Germany of 2022 is not the Germany that opposed the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

One of the characteristics of Germany’s foreign policy in recent decades has been the country’s unwillingness to lead and guide European actions. The reason for this is the material and spiritual expenses related to this leadership. Ambitious foreign policy agendas have not been attractive for German voters.

But in these years, it seems that the western structures have led the German society to believe that it is time for their country to turn its head again, unaware of the costs of such an approach, looking at the history of their country, especially with the crimes committed in World War II. This will be beyond their power.

Schultz implicitly acknowledges that Germany’s Eastern policy (Ostpolitik), which was used in the past specifically to refer to Germany’s relations with the Soviet Union and Russia, has failed, as has the policy of changing trade routes (Wandel durch Handel) which was followed vis-a-vis China and other countries.