Dr. Ali Karbalaei Hosseini – International Law Researcher
In circumstances where the UN Security Council does not recognize the occurrence of aggression and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) merely expresses “concern,” the victimized country faces legal challenges.

Considering this situation, following the joint attack by the Zionist regime and the U.S. on Iran’s nuclear facilities, this note addresses three key issues:

1. How is compensation sought, and which authorities are competent?
2. What is the impact of filing a complaint on the mutual recognition of states?
3. How are practical procedures for documenting and pursuing damages carried out?

First and foremost, it must be considered that international law faces profound challenges in this regard, but alternative solutions do exist.

Conditions for Seeking Compensation and Competent Authorities

The legal foundations for claiming compensation are as follows:

• Responsibility of the Aggressor State:
  Under Article 31 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001), prepared by the UN International Law Commission, which examines the international responsibility of states for breaches of international obligations, any violating state is obligated to provide full reparation (material and moral compensation).
• Violation of Jus Cogens Norms:
  Attack on civilian facilities violates peremptory norms (jus cogens), such as the prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter), which entails absolute responsibility.

Competent Authorities for Adjudicating the Claim

At least four international authorities can be considered for adjudicating this claim:

1. International Court of Justice (ICJ)
2. International Criminal Court (ICC)
3. International Arbitration
4. International Human Rights Courts

The jurisdictional basis and limitations of each are as follows:

• ICJ: Its jurisdiction is based on resolving state disputes under Article 36 of its Statute. The ICJ requires the consent of the parties, either through prior declarations or special agreements.
• ICC: Its jurisdiction covers war crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, including attacks on civilian targets. However, it lacks jurisdiction over civil compensation claims.
• International Arbitration: This requires establishing a specialized tribunal based on a bilateral treaty or specific agreement. The primary limitation is the requirement for the consent of the aggressor regime.
• International Human Rights Courts: These can examine human damages (civilian casualties), but they focus on individual rather than state responsibility.

A key point in the recent case of the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran is that Iran has never recognized this illegitimate regime as a state. Therefore, since filing a case at the ICJ does not imply recognition of the opposing regime, the ICJ could be considered a viable forum for lodging a complaint.

• Under the Montevideo Convention (1933), state recognition requires an explicit declaration. The ICJ ruling in Nicaragua v. U.S. (1986) explicitly states:
  “Merely filing a case against a state in international courts does not in any way imply recognition of its sovereignty or legitimacy.”
  Precedent supports this claim—for example, Palestine filed cases at the ICC against the U.S. and the Zionist regime without recognizing them.

However, a serious legal consideration arises here: filing a case against the Zionist regime and the U.S. may be impossible because neither has accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. Thus, litigation at the ICJ would require their consent, which is unlikely to be obtained.

Practical Procedures for Documenting and Pursuing Damages

For future legal pursuit against these two regimes, immediate steps must be taken to substantiate Iran’s claims:

• Documentation of Damages:
  • Collecting evidence through impartial bodies (e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC) under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977).
  • Using satellite imagery verified by entities like UNOSAT.
• Proving the Civilian Nature of the Facilities:
  • Submitting IAEA inspection reports (even prior to the attack).
  • Aligning with INFCIRC/225 (IAEA physical protection standards).
  • Assessing compliance with Article 56 of Additional Protocol I (1977) (prohibition on attacking hazardous installations).
• Damage Assessment:
  • Applying UNCC guidelines (UN Compensation Commission for Iraq post-1991).

Alternative Mechanisms Given the Infeasibility of Existing International Legal Bodies

Currently, pursuing compensation from the U.S. or the Zionist regime seems practically impossible because:

• The UN Security Council route is blocked by the U.S. veto.
• International legal mechanisms cannot be activated without their consent—what aggressor would willingly submit to a court?

Given the unlikelihood of direct litigation, alternative approaches include:

1. UN General Assembly Resolutions:
   • Seeking a resolution to establish a specialized compensation tribunal (e.g., A/RES/52/164 against Serbia).
2. Domestic Courts in Third Countries:
   • Filing cases under universal jurisdiction (e.g., war crimes laws in Germany or Spain, as in the Pinochet case (1998)).
3. Mobilizing Regional and International Organizations:
   • Leveraging platforms like the OIC, BRICS, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to pressure for compensation.
4. Legal Advocacy in International Bodies:
   • Submitting documented reports to the UN Human Rights Council for condemnation resolutions (similar to those against Israel regarding Palestine).

Actions such as:

• Creating a historical condemnation record in the General Assembly,
• Symbolic sanctions by allies,
• Mobilizing domestic courts in friendly nations under universal jurisdiction can pave the way for compensation claims.

Solutions Beyond Institutional Deadlocks

The most critical point in filing a case at the ICJ is that litigation is possible even without mutual recognition. However, given current conditions, this remains Iran’s least likely option.

Alternative strategies include:

• Regional mechanisms (e.g., the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for legal pressure).
• Political pressure through symbolic General Assembly resolutions to shame the aggressor.

However, as seen in the Diplomatic Hostages case (Iran v. U.S., 1980), compensation is only enforceable if the violating state faces political or economic pressure. Without Security Council support, success depends on forming a broad international coalition.

This scenario demonstrates that international law, in practice, is subject to power dynamics. Yet, victimized states can leverage extra-institutional capacities to create new avenues for justice. While international law may be powerless against major powers, it can still serve as a tool to delegitimize aggressors.

Legal References:

• Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2001) – Articles 31 & 34
• Nicaragua v. U.S. (ICJ, 1986) – Para. 41
• Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) – Article 52
• ICJ Statute – Article 36
• UNCC Guidelines for Damage Assessment