Hossein Sayahi – International Policy Researcher

In his first telephone conversation with Pete Hegsett, the defense secretary of the Donald Trump administration, Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gun agreed to increase the coalition’s deterrent capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the Japanese side, in this agreement, the United States has again emphasized Article 5 of the security treaty between the two countries, which states that it is obliged to defend Japan’s territory.

This support for territorial integrity and protective limits is particularly relevant to the disputed Senkaku Islands, which are islands controlled by Japan, claimed by China, and recognized as Diaoyu. It should be noted that such an agreement primarily pursues its own goals, which Tokyo and Washington are determined to pursue, at least about existing commonalities. In addition, the effects of this agreement and the course taken by the two countries will undoubtedly have significant effects on the dynamics of the strategic Indo-Pacific region. It is very important for Tokyo to strengthen and develop deterrence against Beijing. Despite Japan’s territorial disputes with Russia since the end of World War II, China is the highest priority. It is said that encroachment on Japanese territorial waters and violation of its airspace have long become a habit for China.

China’s People’s Liberation Army insists on its geopolitical and political positions, regardless of Japan’s claims to territorial sovereignty. Therefore, increasing the level of deterrence capabilities in the Japanese army is a high priority for this country. As a first step for the United States, this maximization of the deterrence coefficient can also be part of its broader efforts to counter China’s power projection in the region.

To that end, the Trump administration is likely to seek to support Japan’s expanded role under the country’s 2023 national security strategy, which is based on allowing for retaliatory strike capabilities. Second, the White House wants to message its allies that the United States will support them if they embrace Trump’s preferred burden-sharing approach. This is especially crucial given the current state of the war in Ukraine, Trump’s talk of territorial changes in the country, and his desire to join the Russian Federation.

In addition, the controversial withdrawal from Afghanistan has also called into question Washington’s support for its allies, and the new US administration needs to take a more transparent and assertive approach. The Japan-US agreement could be a starting point for a “no free riding” approach that Trump hopes will become a model for Europe in transatlantic relations. In this regard, Japan has agreed to increase its share of defense spending to 2 percent of GDP.

Trump has also recently announced that Japan has agreed to increase its spending, so we will also use all our deterrence capabilities to defend their territory. He will adopt his own strategies in this regard. Pressure on China through tariffs, pressure on global and regional allies to separate themselves from this country’s chain, and sending sensitive warnings regarding Taiwan will be part of these measures. On the other hand, this action will not remain without a reaction from China and an impact on regional dynamics.

Japan’s actions and the stronger presence of the United States in deterrence equations in the Indo-Pacific region will pave the way for strengthening Beijing’s positions and, in the first step, will lead to the development of an arms race. Xi Jinping has shown that he will not hesitate to pursue the “from wealth to power” policy and is ready to put military development on his agenda under appropriate conditions.

Continuing the current trend will cause China to focus more on developing its nuclear capabilities. For years, China has focused on its DF-41 missiles, which, with their multiple-reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability, have a range of 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers. Developing the fifth-generation J-20 fighter jet and completing sixth-generation designs such as the J-36 fighter and the JH-XX bomber, a project name, could be another part of China’s air and space programs. At sea, alongside the two Kuznetsova-class aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, the all-Chinese Fujian-class aircraft carrier is undergoing sea trials. It will soon become the third active carrier of the Red Dragon, with the Type 003. Class 55 warships are also expanding rapidly, and Beijing is trying to turn the South and East China Seas into a place for them to roam.

In contrast, Japan is trying to position itself technologically, alongside deterrence measures, such as developing its missile and air power, to be a worthy competitor to its powerful rival, China. Tokyo is active in the AUKUS initiative and has undertaken close cooperation with the West in artificial intelligence and quantum technology.

In the second step, regional regimes will also be affected. It is likely that as the regional space becomes more polarized between China and the US-dependent bloc, regional organizations such as ASEAN will also experience more polarization. In this regard, the most affected will be the conservative countries of this regional organization. A country like Vietnam, which has always tried to have constructive relations with both sides, will be more pressured to choose and adopt a clear position. China and the US bloc will try to attract both sides and strengthen its pole. In this way, Beijing will try to use the incentives based on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to create a split in ASEAN.

Regarding the regional outlook, three short-term, medium-term, and long-term perspectives are also conceivable. The region will most likely witness increased tension and confrontation in the short term. The Trump plan and Japan’s threat-oriented perceptions have significantly reduced the likelihood of reaching an agreement with China. Therefore, the

China Sea and the Taiwan Strait will likely be the site of minor and major disputes in the next four years. In the medium term, however, one necessity stands out more than the rest. Over the next decade, Japan will inevitably move towards normalizing its defense posture and, along with counter-strike capabilities, will include offensive capabilities in its national security strategy document.

Trump will not be indifferent to this issue either, and although the US strategy is to increase its presence in this strategic region and the center of gravity of the global economy, the Republican president of the United States is not inclined to treat Japan as a mere dependent against China.

In the long term, however, the region will become more bipolar than ever, and the interdependence that prevails in Southeast Asia will probably not be moderated even between Japan and China. In the desired situation, a bi-multipolar security and technology architecture will be formed, with a US-led bloc on the one hand, and China and projects such as the Digital Silk Road, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Eurasian Partnership on the other.