Dr. Abdulrasoul Divsalar

The ‘Eastward approach’ should be considered as the effect of a new and powerful force in the world order structure, an order that is not necessarily a Western order anymore. This non-Western force is the result of power shift in the world and the gradual development of a more diversified structure of the international order.
The ‘Eastward approach’ policy refers to China, Russia, India and some East Asian countries. These countries follow alternative patterns of making international order. These countries have a growing economic and global power equilibrium, thus naturally creating new actions in order to play a greater role in the development of international order. This role means that more diverse voices would shape the international order.

This new trend is an opportunity for Iran, in the sense that simultaneously with these diverse changes, new voices emerging from China, Russia and India are recognized and accepted in the structure of international order as a force. Now the question is whether Iran can make a strategic decision to maximize its interests in this process of diverse voices in building the international order. The answer is undoubtedly positive. Iran should be able to seek its interests in an emerging non-Western order, which this time is led neither by America or Europe.
Naturally, a significant part of Iran’s national interest is still defined in the classical structure of the West-oriented international order; but another part of our national interests can be pursued in the new voices that are being heard. It is right here that the eastward approach assumes importance. From this perspective, this approach means how the Islamic Republic of Iran would redefine and pursue its interests among the new forces seeking to build the international order.

Iran’s cooperation with Russia in Syria is an illustrative example of how cooperating with a force that is currently defined in the Eastern orientation can serve some of Iran’s interests. So theoretically, the question is how can Iran stabilize its position among the emerging powers, China, Russia and India while regulating its relations with the classical Western powers, Europe and the United States?
Therefore, a structural necessity resulting from changes in the global shift of power imposes the need to turn to the East through more precise definitions. For example, the signing of a Free Trade Agreement between China and the European Union is an important example of the process of changing the power and structural requirements of Europe in its approach to the East.

The question now is whether the signing of this agreement means that Europeans want to come out of the West-oriented structure and enter the Eastern domain? The answer is certainly negative. It rather means that Europe is also redefining its relations with the East.
In spite of the structural requirements of approaching towards the East, this key argument should not be forgotten that in the long run, the Islamic Republic of Iran needs to resolve its conflicting points of difference with the dominant Western order. Otherwise, it cannot find a desirable position in the Eastern order either, because the cohesion of the emerging Eastern power with the dominant Western power is indisputable.

The Eastern order, before consolidating in the international structure, is reluctant to directly confront the Western order and power, because it wants to use its structural grounds to optimize its power. It is therefore necessary to observe this misunderstanding that the emerging Eastern order does not necessarily seek to replace the declining Western order but rather to recognize its role in the structure of the present order.

In fact, eastern forces such as Russia, China, and India are looking to find their place and identify their interests in the Western order. These actions and reactions will change the structure, and if we assume such a thing, it is natural for the Eastern powers not to necessarily have an exaggerated or subversive look at the existing order, but they maintain a reformist outlook.

Therefore, if Iran is placed in conflict with the existing international order, it will naturally not be successful in its approach to the East policy. If Iran fails to resolve its conflicting points in the existing international structure, it will not succeed in the long run in its approach to the East policy. The perception about Iran as an anti-system force would also undermine the interests of the Eastern powers, and would fail Iran’s ‘Eastward approach’ policy. Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to imagine a shift towards the East to confront the dominant forces of the Western order. An obvious example of this is the predictable and radical reactions of the eastern powers to the unrealistic claims over the previous years about diversion of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.

Thus, orientation towards the East is a policy adaptation to the natural changes in the international order, and it is natural for the Islamic Republic of Iran to redefine itself in this new structure. Iran can define at least two main benefits from leaning towards the East; first, it is political-security advantage. After all, Iran is faced with an overarching political approach and is continuously threatened in security fields by the Western order. Eastward approach can create a balance in this direction and place Iran in a balance of power with the ruling forces in the international order. Therefore, in the security domain Eastward approach can be considered as a balancing act and put Iran in a state of equilibrium with the ruling forces. Another benefit is economic. As the flow of economic power and money production in the world evolve, Iran must be able to keep pace with this trend. In this way, the need to turn to the East is a combination of structural, systemic, security and economic requirements.