Arian Noorani – International Affairs Analyst
Russia’s Upper Hand in Peace Negotiations
Despite human and equipment losses, Russia has demonstrated that it considers strategic patience and a war of attrition as effective tools. Analysis of the field situation shows that Russia has maintained military pressure by increasing ammunition production, rebuilding old stockpiles, and reinforcing its manpower. Despite limitations in significant advances, through drone attacks, mine-laying, and maintaining a constant threat, it has exhausted and weakened Ukraine’s defensive space.
Under such conditions, any premature peace negotiations are seen by Russia as solidifying the status quo and preserving the occupied territories. From Moscow’s perspective, the war is not merely a tool for seizing land but also a means to change the European and global security order. From this viewpoint, altering borders and dividing regions, even if it leads to an unstable compromise, holds strategic value.
Moscow is now exploiting time and the fatigue of the opposing side: each day that Ukrainian territory suffers more damage, infrastructure collapses, and hope for broad Western support weakens, Russia’s position at the negotiating table strengthens.

The West’s Failure to Maintain Sustained Pressure on Russia
Today, European countries and America have become indecisive in making collective and decisive decisions regarding the war in Ukraine. Europe has limited its role in providing financial and military aid to Kyiv, and resources to meet Ukraine’s needs are diminishing. If this trend continues, the country will soon be financially and militarily incapacitated. In this regard, European aid over the past six months has significantly decreased.
This situation has two consequences: first, a reduction in Ukraine’s motivation and defensive capacity; second, a decrease in its bargaining power in negotiations. If Europe cannot or will not help Ukraine with sufficient resources and weapons, how can it hold a meaningful position at the peace negotiation table? Without Europe providing adequate funding and arms to Ukraine, the continent’s presence in negotiations will be merely a political gesture.
On the other hand, Western economic pressure and sanctions on Russia have also not been sufficiently effective. This is because Russia, relying on military and industrial stockpiles, has increased domestic production of ammunition and light equipment and prepared itself for a prolonged war. Therefore, the sanctions, which were intended to increase the cost of war for Moscow, have been only partially effective. As a result, the West has failed to simultaneously apply military and economic pressure in a way that aligns Moscow’s interests with ending the war. This lack of consensus and weak political will has left Europe indecisive about its path.

Structural Obstacles in Ukraine for Continuing the War
The weakening of Ukraine’s defensive capability is not only due to military pressure and weapon shortages but also rooted in the country’s economic and social conditions. Energy infrastructure has been targeted by repeated Russian attacks, blackouts, and cold have become part of daily life, and people are tired of the war’s economic consequences. Additionally, internal corruption and the crisis of public trust in the central government have complicated the government’s position. Ukraine’s political class is entangled in internal disputes and managerial disagreements and lacks sufficient transparency and accountability. This situation creates a suitable opportunity for Moscow and even America to increase pressure on Kyiv to accept a compromise, even if unfavorable.
In such a context, any peace plan imposed from outside might appear attractive to some war-weary segments of society, but it will not be desirable for Ukrainian statesmen who must confront its security and political consequences. Therefore, negotiations that attempt to resolve the crisis technically will not withstand Ukraine’s social and political realities.

Negotiation Outlook
Currently, three probable paths lie ahead for Ukraine and Europe: first, a fragile peace with concessions to Russia; if Europe and America, under pressure from domestic fatigue and resource limitations, persuade Kyiv to accept a peace with heavy concessions, an agreement may be signed. But this peace will be fragile and temporary. Russia will still maintain the motivation to topple Ukraine at an opportune time, and this agreement will only solidify the current situation, not lead to lasting peace.
Second, the continuation of a war of attrition without a prospect for agreement, turning it into a diplomatic stalemate; if no agreement is reached and Western support further declines, the war may enter a stage of “frozen conflict,” meaning the occupation of part of Ukrainian territory without active continuation of war. This situation is similar to past cases, such as the Minsk agreements. However, experience has shown that this does not provide real security, and the danger of war reigniting remains.
Third, continuation of the war and increased pressure on Russia; if Europe and America decide to strengthen their financial and military support for Ukraine, intensify sanctions, and even take limited military actions, Russia might return to the negotiation table under more challenging conditions.

Conclusion
Overall, the failure of Ukraine’s peace negotiations has deep, structural reasons: Russia’s strategy to improve its position in a war of attrition, Europe’s weakness and confusion in building consensus, and the gradual collapse of Ukraine’s defensive and economic capabilities. Within a realistic framework, this situation is the result of a power struggle.
Lasting peace will only be possible when Moscow’s interests in continuing the war end, Europe deploys sufficient will and resources, and Ukraine enters negotiations with a resilient and united political and economic structure. Any agreement reached before these conditions are met, even if signed, will more resemble a temporary ceasefire than a real and lasting solution. This agreement might delay the end of the war but also sow the seeds for future crises.