Abdolamir Nabavi, in an interview with the website of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, stated: The main factor for the strategic redefinition of Egypt in the region is ‘facing the expansionism of the Israeli regime.” Reviewing the developments in general, this university professor emphasizes: “The speed and depth of geopolitical changes in West Asia, especially after the repeated aggressions of the Israeli regime against Syria, Lebanon, etc., as well as the attacks on Iran and Qatar, have compelled other governments to seek new, promising and reassuring anchors for themselves by diversifying partnerships and expanding economic and diplomatic relations, intending to manage crises.” According to him, “In recent years, Cairo has tried to strengthen its connections, in addition to Europe and the United States, with important actors such as China, Russia, Turkey, and Qatar, to rebuild its field of action and leverage in regional equations.”

The senior Egyptian affairs analyst says: “The pivotal factor for Cairo’s concern has been the intensification of the aggressive actions of the Israeli regime after the Gaza war in October 2023; an operation that, in his opinion, has extended beyond the borders of Palestine, and its most worrying effect is the explicit or implicit support or alignment of major foreign actors with this regime. These trends, especially when combined with uncertainty in security and stability indicators, have forced Cairo to review its foreign policy quickly.”

The senior West Asian affairs expert pointed to the overlapping internal and regional challenges of Egypt and stated: “The conflicts on Egypt’s eastern border and the Gaza crisis, persistent instability in Libya to the west, the civil war in Sudan to the south, and the water dispute with Ethiopia over Nile resources are among the other factors that have driven Cairo towards diversifying its relations.” He believes that “the combination of these risks has exposed Egypt, from a national security perspective, to political, economic, and humanitarian pressures and has doubled the necessity of diversifying strategic partners.”

This expert emphasizes: “In this framework, Cairo neither seeks to cut off relations with its strategic treaties with the West nor intends to sacrifice the economic and political interests derived from four-decade-old agreements like Camp David for new actions; rather, the goal is to intelligently use these cognitive and legal relations to exert pressure on various regional governments and manage threats.” Therefore, Nabavi points out that “Egypt, while expanding cooperation with other actors, also tries to manage its strategic relations with Washington and Tel Aviv.”

This university professor regarding Egypt-Turkey relations says: “The improvement of relations between the two countries has been subject to clear conditions, including controlling the political and media flows related to the Muslim Brotherhood based in Turkey, which is considered dangerous by Cairo.” He adds: “These conditions have been somewhat met in practice, and for this reason, the possibility of advancing military-defensive cooperation and joint exercises has been provided, but the formation of an independent regional ‘axis’ that specifically wants to stand against Western actors or Tel Aviv seems unlikely in the short term.”

The senior Egyptian affairs analyst simultaneously warns: “One of Egypt’s strategic concerns is the possibility of forced migration of Gaza Strip residents to the Sinai Peninsula; a phenomenon that from Cairo’s perspective could have long-term security, humanitarian, and economic consequences and reduce Egypt’s diplomatic maneuverability in the Palestinian dossier.” Therefore, he reminds that “any permanent settlement of Gazans in Sinai would impose additional pressure on Egypt’s fragile economy and bring complexities for border control, and for this reason, Egyptians are trying, through new agreements and diversifying their foreign relations, to seek a new balance against the Israeli regime.”

The West Asian affairs analyst also points to “other new regional agreements, such as the Saudi-Pakistani defense agreement, which could shift security equations against the Israeli regime,” and adds that “the entry of new actors into defense pacts, along with new military capabilities, adds new variables to the power equations that Egypt must carefully monitor and predict the outcome for its national interests.”

Nabavi outlines “Cairo’s selective position” as such: “Egypt has chosen the option of diversifying relations so that, by relying on several economic-diplomatic axes, it can remain safe from unilateral pressure and sudden changes in the region’s security environment; but at the same time, it maintains its strategic relationship with the West and international legal capacities as tools for survival and uses them to manage tensions and curb the unregulated growth of the influence and expansionism of the Israeli regime.”