Mohammad Saleh Sedghian, in an interview with the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations’ website, stated, “The timing of this plan’s unveiling, just a few months before the parliamentary elections, sends a clear message.” He believes: “Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, Iraq’s Prime Minister, by introducing a plan with ambitious goals, is seeking to send a hopeful message to the Iraqi public opinion as well as to political and economic elites. But the on-the-ground realities of Iraq and the complex power structure in the country prevent such a plan from quickly turning into a tangible achievement.”

The West Asia affairs expert explained that “Iraqi media and public opinion in the days following the unveiling did not widely welcome Vision 2050.” In his opinion, “This was not only due to weaknesses in information dissemination and detailing by the government, but also stems from the different priorities of the Iraqi people. In a situation where Iraqi society is grappling with widespread unemployment, administrative corruption, livelihood problems, and security challenges, a plan with a long-term horizon and general objectives cannot address the primary concerns of voters.” This expert emphasizes that “In the months leading up to the elections, people’s attention is more focused on immediate and tangible issues; from the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’bi) and Baghdad-Washington relations to the crises of unemployment and public services in provinces like Basra, Nasiriyah, and Najaf. In such an atmosphere, although a plan like Vision 2050 can be a propaganda tool for the government, it is unlikely to become a decisive factor in the election results.”

According to the senior Iraq affairs analyst, “Through this move, Al-Sudani is seeking to send two parallel messages; on one hand, he is trying to attract the support of academic, economic, and social elites for the government; on the other hand, he wants to present an image of a forward-looking government that is thinking about Iraq’s long-term development. But the reality of the country’s political scene shows that the government’s political rivals, by highlighting existing shortcomings, including the inability to curb corruption, resolve the unemployment crisis, and improve urban services, are trying to neutralize this message.”

Sedghian, referring to some reforms and construction projects by the Iraqi government over the past four years, including the development of the electricity grid, building bridges in Baghdad, and progress in some infrastructure projects, says: “Although these achievements are notable, they have not yet been able to change the overall image of inefficiency in Iraq’s political and administrative structure.” He believes: “The political atmosphere in Iraq is such that even positive government actions fade in the dust of electoral competition, and attention is drawn more than ever towards problems and failures.”

From the perspective of this West Asia affairs expert, “The Iraq Vision 2050 plan, if implemented, could create significant opportunities for regional cooperation, especially with Iran. Projects like the development corridor, which aims to turn Iraq into a passageway for 20 percent of Asia-Europe trade, will create unprecedented transit and economic capacities. For Iran, such plans could simultaneously mean paving the way for expanding trade relations, increasing security cooperation, and consolidating political ties with Baghdad.”

But he adds that “Realizing these opportunities requires overcoming structural obstacles in Iraq.” In Sedghian’s view, “Environmental crises, ethnic and religious conflicts, security challenges in border provinces, as well as external pressures on Baghdad, could cause any development plan to face delays or even failure.” The Iraq affairs expert emphasizes that “The Al-Sudani government has faced a series of pressures in recent months, from protests related to employee salary payments to widespread criticism of economic management and corruption cases. In such an environment, unveiling a long-term plan may be an effort to attract public attention and create a positive atmosphere ahead of the elections. However, it is unlikely that this move alone can fundamentally change electoral trends.”

The West Asia affairs analyst, in another part of his assessment, emphasizes that “Even if Vision 2050 is presented with more details and gains the support of economic and academic elites, its implementation will not be possible without sustained political stability.” He notes that “Iraq’s experience over the past two decades has shown that any long-term development project is subject to changes in governments, parliamentary disputes, and pressure from various political groups.” Overall, Sedghian believes that “Vision 2050 is more an effort to present an image of a new Iraq than an immediate executable plan; an Iraq that wants to move away from a single-product economy, play a role in regional and global equations, and return from the periphery of crises to the center of development. However, realizing this dream requires deep political reforms, security stability, and national consensus; prerequisites without which even the best plans will turn into a list of unfulfilled wishes.”