Hossein Siyahi – International Politics Researcher

Regardless of whether such a claim is true or false, a successful test of such a missile could significantly affect the regional and even global levels. Although the Hwasong-19 will still require further testing, it could pave the way for substantial changes in Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture and the balance of power and deterrence.

The North Korean missile is a new version of the Hwasong-18. However, it can fly for a longer time and reach a higher maximum altitude. In addition, the Hwasong-19 has other new and significant features. This missile uses solid fuel. Solid fuel will provide a higher launch speed for this intercontinental ballistic missile. However, the most important and impressive feature will be this missile’s Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability, which will be summarized in the multiple targeting capability. In fact, each missile can be carried on a platform called a base and carry several warheads. Thus, if there are doubts about the Hwasong-19 as the most potent strategic missile in the world, there is no doubt about the fantastic progress of North Korea’s missile technologies. In the multiple targeting system, the missile is launched like an intercontinental ballistic missile during the launch phase, reaches space and maneuvers in it. In the next phase, individual and separate warheads will be released at different angles. The Warheads can be spread out over a radius of several hundred kilometers and hit various targets.

Therefore, the addition of the new Hwasong-19 to North Korea’s arsenal will make it a little harder for Pyongyang’s rivals to digest the current reality. For example, North Korea already has missiles in its arsenal that can reach the United States. However, the purpose of developing the Hwasong-19 was most likely to carry heavier payloads and warheads, which could be considered a great challenge for Washington if combined with a multiple targeting system.

Such missiles limit missile defense systems and weaken their effectiveness due to several factors. Some of these factors are the requirement for multiple interceptions and the need to intercept each warhead separately, the challenge of distinguishing warheads from decoys, the constraints on decision-making, and the time constraints on taking appropriate action and response.

Another critical issue is the action and response of regional and transregional actors. North Korea is likely to have undertaken such a test with a specific purpose. The unveiling of such a missile could put the country in a better position in potential negotiations, especially with the Trump administration. Pyongyang knows that taking a bolder stance against Trump will not be possible without an influential card. In addition, the country has now shown that it has achieved advanced missile technology. Some believe that its missile program has been developed with Russian assistance and is influenced by Moscow’s technologies. However, by examining the Hwasong-18 missile, which is nearly 28 meters long, and Russian and American missiles, which are generally 20 meters long, it can be concluded that North Korea has not been so dependent on Russian technology. Also, as mentioned previously, access to such weapons could increase the effectiveness of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and strengthen Pyongyang’s deterrence while changing the balance of power and security in the region.

On the other hand, the region will also change. Increased tension, the possibility of an arms race, and attempts to maximize power fan the flames of the security puzzle. As a result, the fragility of regional stability and balance will be some of the possible future events in Southeast Asia. With North Korea’s strengthening of its position through the Hwasong-19 test, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and even Taiwan will be affected. Japan will definitely pursue its weapons development program. This could further increase the likelihood of an arms race scenario in the region.

The Japanese government knows that with the Trump administration and its “America First” approach coming to power, the burden of responsibility on its allies will increase, and their share of defense spending will certainly increase. South Korea’s security programs will also change. The country’s three-tier security and defense system, known as the Kill Chain, which was designed based on its preemptive strike strategy against North Korea, cannot be as effective as it was in the past and will need to be reviewed and strengthened.

The kill chain will be based on decision-making and attack. The strategic importance of this system is based on increasing South Korea’s deterrence against threats from its northern neighbor, reducing reaction time, increasing survivability, and providing multiple response options. However, despite the recent developments in this system, including integration with US regional systems, strengthening missile systems, increasing cyber capabilities, and improving surveillance and control capabilities, South Korea has a very limited decision-making window. Also, it requires very precise information and complex coordination. It is clear that the new features of the Hwasong mentioned at the beginning, namely multiple launches, greater flexibility, higher speed, and shorter launch time, can be considered a significant challenge for Seoul and the kill chain cyber security.

The positions of China, Russia, and the United States are also important. Moscow is likely to support this country due to current tensions and movements at the global level, especially the war in Europe and North Korea’s support by sending troops to the Ukrainian fronts. It is likely that the Kremlin while supporting diplomatic channels, will oppose further sanctions on North Korea. Beijing may adopt a dual and gray position. Economic support for Pyongyang, resistance to its sanctions, and efforts to maintain regional stability will be part of China’s actions. The United States under Donald Trump will complicate the situation and determine the region’s future, at least in the short term. The pressure program on North Korea and Trump’s fire-and-fury approach will most likely continue. These will include increased sanctions and economic pressure. The military presence in the region will also be strengthened. However, the door to negotiations with North Korea will not be closed.

The new US president has shown that he is interested in adding a grand deal in East Asia to his foreign policy repertoire and making it a brand card for the elections, both presidential and congressional midterms. Therefore, returning to the negotiating table and promoting direct personal diplomacy, even to the extent of a meeting between Trump and Kim, is not far-fetched. Hwasong-19 will likely be a small golden leaf in this framework. Trump may replace the nuclear disarmament program with a restriction on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and an agreement between the two sides will begin with limited economic incentives. This could somewhat distance the region from the growing tension and restore temporary Southeast Asian stability.